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THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS OF




The recent declaration by the American Medical Association of a medical
malpractice "crisis" requiring major legal reform' inspires a sense of djd vu.
We have, it seems, been here before. A decade ago tort law was widely
denounced for creating a similar crisis for medical care providers.2 The
problem then was huge increases in insurance premiums and the departure of
some insurance carriers from malpractice underwriting. These events
sparked a general alarm over the economic viability and quality of health care 3
and caused investigations to be launched by the federal and state
governments and private groups.4 Reforms occurred in both legal rules and
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1. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at A16, col. 4; see also SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROF. LIAB. AND
INS., Am. MEDICAL. Ass'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, REPORTS 1, 2 & 3 (1984-1985)
(originally published as supplements to AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 1984, Nov. 1984, Mar. 1985)
[hereinafter AMA TASK FORCE]. For earlier reports on the continued upward trend in claims and in
insurance costs, see, for example, Stein, The High Cost of Suing, NAT'L J., Feb. 25, 1984, at 382;
Taravella, Physicians Faced With Ballooning lalpractice Rates, Bus. INS., Sept. 16. 1983, at 1, 56-57.
2. The "crisis" spawned an enormous literature. Useful general discussions of the problem
and references to other discussion can be found in the following: TIIE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978); S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF
MALPRACTICE (1978); Abraham, Aledical Malpractice Reform: .4 Prelitninary Analysis. 36 MD. L. REV. 489
(1977); Symposium on ,ledical lalpractice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1177. Most of the literature is roughly
contemporaneous with the crisis and its immediate aftermath in the mid to late 1970's. However, an
important series of studies by Patricia Danzon provide a more current perspective on the problems.
Since the present article was substantially completed Danzon's studies have been partly updated and
now appear, with a contemporary commentary on the on-going "crisis" in P. DANZON, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985). References herein to her work
continue to be to the earlier sources.
3. See generally U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE & APPENDIX (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
4. The leading study on a national level was that of a special commission formed by HEW. See
id. At the state level, more than forty groups reportedly undertook formal studies. See Grossman, An
Analysis of 1975 Legislation Relating to Medical Malpractice, in A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ISSUE 4 (D. Warren & R. Merritt eds. 1976). For a sample of such studies, see, for
example, BUREAU OF INS., VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN VIRGINIA:
THE SCOPE AND SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS (1975); MASS. SPECIAL
COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, ANNUAL REPORT (1978) (reported annually from 1976-1979);
NEW YORK SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, REPORT (1976).
In addition to these official public studies, there were numerous private studies. See, e.g., AM. BAR
ASs'N, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY (1976); Am. Ins.
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insurance practices. 5  By the end of the 1970's, the momentum for
institutional change and legal reforms was spent. Whether the changes and
reforms solved the underlying problems or merely appeared to do so, they
did have the immediate effect of dissipating the crisis atmosphere that had
earlier prevailed.
Renewed increases in the severity (size) and frequency (number) of
malpractice claims, accompanied by new increases in insurance premiums,6
are now causing fresh anxiety within the medical profession. New proposals
for legal reform have included not only a myriad of bills in state legislatures-
only a handful of which have been enacted to date 7-but also two bills in
Congress. 8 This renewed interest in the problem makes timely another look
at the crisis of the 1970's and the legal and insurance changes it produced.
This article begins with a summary of the events of the early 197 0's and a
review of what is known of the immediate causes of those events-namely the
unexpected rise in legal claims and recoveries, certain insurance practices that
exacerbated the problem, and exogenous developments in the economy.
Various speculations about the causes of the increase in legal claims,
particularly the role of legal doctrine, are reviewed. Because liberalization of
liability rules was widely blamed for producing the escalation of malpractice
claims leading up to the crisis, reform of those rules became the focus of
political attention. The article provides some skeptical comments on the
degree to which the ostensible reforms actually changed tort law and closes
with a few comments about the alleged reemergence of the crisis.
The malpractice crisis of the mid-1970's had several facets. For health
care providers the immediate crisis was essentially twofold: a sudden and
substantial increase in malpractice insurance premium rates and, worse, the
threat that liability coverage would become unavailable at any price as a
consequence of carrier withdrawal from the field.9  For the carriers
themselves, the crisis was an unanticipated increase in both the number of
claims filed for negligent injuries and the amounts recovered.' 0 Rising
underwriting costs were compounded by investment losses that a nationwide
recession inflicted on insurance companies along with other investors.''
If the public at large were aware of any crisis, it is unlikely that they directly
felt its effects. Although patients may have paid somewhat higher medical and
Ass'n & Ins. Servs. Office, All-Industry Committee Special Malpractice Review: 1974 Closed Claim
Survey (1976); AM. MEDICAL Ass'N, MALPRACTICE IN Focus (1975) (collecting and reviewing data
from other studies, principally by state medical associations); A. MURRAY, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
SITUATION IN CALIFORNIA (1976).
5. See infra notes 73-116 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
11. See Kendall, Expectations, Imperfect Aarkets, and Medical lalpractice Insurance, in THE ECONOMICS
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, at 167, 180-81; Roddis & Stewart, The Insurance of Aledical
Losses, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1281, 1289 (1975).
[Vol. 49: No. 2
Page 5: Spring 1986] MALPRACTICE CRISIS OF THE 1970's
hospital bills as the costs of malpractice insurance passed through the system,
the third-party payment system tends to diffuse and obscure the effect of
higher costs on the patient's own purse. 12 Moreover, in a health care system
already plagued by costs rising substantially faster than inflation, even a
dramatic increase in liability costs would be scarcely noticeable.' 3
The people's legislative representatives, however, with the aid of lobbyists
for the medical profession, could see the potential for disruption in medical
services if insurance became unavailable to the profession or if its costs
became too burdensome. Something had to be done, or at least something
had to appear to the relevant constituencies to be done. 14 That "something"
consisted of a considerable amount of legislative activity ostensibly directed at
changing the liability rules underlying the malpractice legal system. How
much the changes were substantive and how much they were cosmetic is a
matter best deferred until after the nature and genesis of the underlying
problem have been reviewed.
II
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AND INSURANCE COSTS
A study conducted for the HEW Secretary's Commission on Medical
Malpractice provides the most dramatic evidence of the 1970's malpractice
crisis-the sudden rise in malpractice insurance premiums.15 Illustrative of
the general pattern are the data for insureds in the next-to-lowest and the
12. See, e.g., K. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING, 202-04 (1971) (general
discussion of the moral hazard problem in the context of health insurance); M. FELDSTEIN, HOSPITAL
COSTS AND HEALTH INSURANCE 5-6, 93-94 (1981). To explain the moral hazard problem, Feldstein
notes that employers pay a large fraction of the insurance cost. Thus, although insurance costs
increases might lead to lower net wages, this fact may not be perceived by employees. However, the
problem may not be entirely one of perception but also one of free-riding (each employee expects to
externalize a disproportionate share of their health service costs to other insureds).
13. Even at its present high level, malpractice insurance costs are less than one percent of total
health care expenditures. For 1984, total health care costs were reported at $387.4 billion. 7
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 9 (1985). For the same years, the total medical malpractice insurance
premium costs have been estimated to be about $2.7 billion. MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, INC.,
ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN MEDICAl. ASSOCIATION TORT REFORM PROPOSALS 2 (Sept. 1985).
The estimates are based on Best's reports-the leading source of insurance data-supplemented by
data for insurers not reporting to Best's. Inexplicably the Milliman-Robertson report of Best's data
gives a much higher figure than Best's own reports for 1984. See 46 BEST'S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES,
PROPERTY/CASUALTY 105 (1985). Attempting to reconcile the disparate reporting would be of no
real consequence in this instance. Even accepting the higher figure, the insurance costs are
considerably under one percent of the total health care expenditures.
14. For legislators concerned about reelection (or comparable reward from their constituencies)
the key, of course, is to appear responsive to demands by those constituents who are important to
achieving those rewards. See generally D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13-77
(1974). Given the organized power of the medical profession, it is not surprising that legislators
would be solicitous of the profession's concern about the malpractice crisis. However, the
complexity of the law and its effects make measuring the true effectiveness of legislative action
difficult. This monitoring problem is not unique to malpractice, but it warrants mention to counter
the frequent assumption that the legal reforms in this area were in fact responsive to the problems
that the medical constituency identified.
15. Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, in HEW REPORT, supra note 3, at
app. 494.
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next-to-highest risk rating categories.' 6 From 1960 to 1972, the average
premium costs for the former category increased an estimated 600%, while
those of the latter class increased about 900%.' 7 It should be emphasized
that these are nationwide averages; some states experienced even higher rates
of increase.' 8 Hospital insurance premiums showed a similar pattern, with an
average nationwide increase of some 750% between 1965 and 1973,
according to one study.' 9 Again, considerable variation existed among states
and among hospitals.20
Data on premium increases are a misleading indicator of the malpractice
problem because they are not related to provider income. The HEW survey
shows that premium costs relative to professional income rose just under
300% from 1962 to 1970. However, the ratio was still modest in absolute
terms. Premium costs were 1.8% of income for a "class 2" physician, and
4.2% for a "class 4" surgeon. 21  Recent data show comparably low
percentages. 22 These figures may still tell very little because they do not show
how much of the increased premiums were passed on to patients and their
health care insurers.
The rise in premium rates was only part of the crisis. Potentially more
troublesome was the actual or threatened withdrawal from the malpractice
market by some major insurers under the combined pressure of volatile
underwriting risks, investment losses, and uncertain profits. For most of
16. Under the rating system used by the Insurance Services Organization (ISO), physicians are
classified into five categories according to the degree of liability risk associated with their practice. In
general, this risk is roughly correlated to the degree of participation in surgery. The premium rates
assigned the five ISO categories are multiples of the "class I" rate. For example, in 1972, the "class
2" rate was 175 percent of the "class 1," while "class 4" was 400 percent of "class 1.- See id. at app.
533-34. It is now common for major insurance carriers to use more than five rating categories. See
MEDICAL LIABILITY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., PREMIUM RATE SCHEDULES Uuly 1. 1983) (14 specialty
categories).
17. See Kendall & Haldi, supra note 15, at app. 541. Kendall and Haldi's percentages are indexed
to a 1966 base; those in the text are extrapolations.
18. The rate experience in each state over varying periods-generally, the early 19 70's-is
reviewed in AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 24, 1975, reprinted in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG. IST SESS., AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 205-18 (Comm.
Print 1975).
19. See M. SUMMER, THE DOLLARS AND SENSE OF HOSPITAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 19 (1979).
The percentages presented therein are derived from aggregate earned premium volume.
20. See id.
21. Kendall & Haldi, supra note 15, at app. 541.
22. Surveys by the AMA show the mean ratios of premium costs to gross income, for all
physicians, have fluctuated between 2% and 5% since 1973. For instance, the mean was 4.4% in
1976, 3% in 1981, and 3.7% in 1983. Am. MEDICAL Ass'N, 1973-80 AMA PERIODIC SURVEYS OF
PHYSICIANS; AM. MEDICAL Ass'N, 1981-83 SOCIOECONOMIC MONITORING CARE SURVEYS (both AMA
surveys are cited in background materials prepared for the 1985 National Medical Malpractice
Conference sponsored by The Urban Institute, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find
Relief? (R. Bovbjerg & C. Havighurst eds., Working Paper 3417-01, Mar. 1985)) [hereinafter cited as
AMA SURVEYS]. A recent AMA report gives a figure of 7.7% for 1984. AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, REPONSE
OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION TO THE ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA
STATEMENTS REGARDING THE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY CRISIS app. table 2 (1985). However, that
figure is the ratio of premium costs to pretax net income. [he appropriate measure is the ratio to
gross income. The AMA's data show this to be about 4.2% for 1984. See AM. MEDICAL ASS'N,
SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 110, 116, 120 (1985) (showing net income,
total expenses, and premium costs).
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them, malpractice was not a major line of underwriting in any case, making
withdrawal in the face of uncertain future profitability relatively easy. 23 A
precipitating factor in some states was the refusal of insurance commissioners
to permit large premium rate hikes-often at the urging of state medical
societies. 24 Conditions such as these reduced the likelihood that the place of
a vacating insurer would be quickly filled by another carrier.
There is not much dispute about these basic events. Nor is there much
dispute about their immediate causes. The insurer's investment losses were
traceable to general economic conditions. Their underwriting losses reflected
unexpected increases in both the frequency and the severity of insured claims.
The hard questions are why claims and costs suddenly increased and why
these increases were not anticipated.
The conventional insurance explanation for underwriting losses stresses
the difficulties of actuarial prediction of future claims exposure. 25 Part of the
problem is said to arise from the small number of insureds in any particular
risk category or geographic region, which creates a "credibility" problem with
the data from which claims exposure is estimated. 26 The credibility problem
was compounded by the scant attention that the companies gave to risk and
rate loss evaluations for this relatively minor line of insurance. 27 In part, the
steep climb reflected years of insurer neglect of the changing legal and social
environment affecting malpractice claims. This neglect, followed by the
carriers' rude awakening, precluded a more gradual premium adjustment. 28
When the increases came, they were greater in percentage terms than recent
claims increases appeared to explain, as insurers projected the trends they
were seeing into the future and sought premiums sufficient to cover losses
incurred at even higher rates. Many observers were unconvinced that the new
premium levels were a fair reflection of anticipated claims experience, a
skepticism applied with equal force to current premium levels.
23. For a mid-1975 survey of carriers withdrawing from one or more markets, see AM. MEDICAL
Ass'N, MALPRACTICE IN Focus 19-20 (1975). Personal correspondence with insurance carriers shows
withdrawal from the malpractice line by such major companies as Wausau, Hartford, Fireman's
Fund, United States Fidelity and Guarantee, and Travelers. The impact of withdrawal by major
carriers was enhanced by the fact that insurance is commonly written, on a group basis, for the
medical society in a particular area.
24. See Danzon, An Economic Analysis of the Medical Malpractice System, 1 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 39, 49
(1983).
25. For a good, concise description of the actuarial process as applied to malpractive insurance,
see Roddis & Stewart, supra note 11, at 1290-97.
26. See id. at 1294.
27. See Kendall, supra note 11, at 175 (prior to 1970 medical malpractice was less than 0.5% of
total property and liability insurance premium volume).
28. The failure of insurers to collect better information about changes affecting their
underwriting risks was not necessarily negligent. See Roddis & Stewart, supra note 11, at 1289.
Insurers have traditionally offset unexpected underwriting losses with investment earnings. In fact,
the general pattern was that the very economic cause of loss on one side of the ledger usually
produced gain on the other. Since many carriers abandoned malpractice lines in the 1970's, it
appears that underwriting losses were not fully offset by investment returns derived from malpractice
premiums.
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The difficulty that figures most prominently in all explanations of the
insurers' problems is the "long tail" of malpractice claims. In contrast to
some other forms of indemnity, where claims are filed and losses fully
developed within a short period after the insured event, medical malpractice
claims, relating to injuries that may not come immediately to light and that
take time for claimants to investigate, may not mature for as much as a
decade. 29 Slowness in the development of claims increases the uncertainty
inherent in the "development" of losses and in the "trending" of loss
experience (that is, adjusting projections for anticipated alterations in
conditions affecting future payouts).3 0
Uncertainty in general and the "long tail" in particular provide an
incomplete explanation of the 1970's malpractice crisis because they leave out
the instability of the underlying events. The "long tail" on claims exposure
would be irrelevant in a steady-state environment or if the rate of change in
the incidence of claims were constant.3 1 To create an actuarial problem, the
long tail must be accompanied by unpredictable changes affecting claims
payments. Although unanticipated inflation, reflected in damage awards,
might be one example, the surge of inflation in the 1970's is unlikely to have
had more than a slight effect on tort recoveries during that period because the
contested injuries were sustained earlier, during a period of more gradual and
predictable price rises. Analyses of the long-tail problem typically emphasize
that the uncertainty confronting underwriters resulted from changes in the
inflation-adjusted severity of claims.
The rise in the number and size of malpractice claims over the decade
preceding the crisis was striking. For example, industry data on malpractice
claims in the late 1960's and early 1970's showed an annual increase in claims
frequency (defined as claims per 100 doctors) of more than twelve percent
and an increase in severity (defined as average cost per claim) of more than
ten percent.3 2 Although there was considerable variation,3 3 virtually every
professional specialty and virtually every state experienced increases of such
magnitude and duration as to compel a search for causes other than pure
chance. What would produce such a severe and sudden change in claims?
The usual answers consist of a mixture of generalizations about changes in
health care, in public attitudes, and in the legal system. 34
29. For a good discussion of the problem, see Kendall, supra note 11, at 181-89.
30. See id. On development and trending generally, see Hearing Before the Subconmm. on Health of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Continuing Medical Malpractice Insurance Crises, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 183, 196-209 (1975) (report of the All-Industry Medical Malpractice Insurance Committee);
Roddis & Stewart, supra note 11, at 1294-97.
31. See Mann, Factors Affecting the Supply Price of Medical Malpractice Insurance, in THE ECONOMICS OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, at 155, 156-57.
32. See Kendall, supra note 11, at 187.
33. Scattered data on claims frequency and severity are given in AM. MED. NEws, supra note 18.
34. See, e.g., VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, supra note 4, at 54.
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III
THE SEARCH FOR CAUSES
One speculation is that the increase in malpractice claims in the early
1970's reflected a decline in standards of medical practice. This assertion can
be dismissed fairly easily. No reliable evidence, other than the incidence of
legal claims, supports the implausible notion that there had been, in absolute
or relative terms, a decline in medical practice standards. Moreover, the
suggestion does not correlate well with the fact that the incidence of claims
was highest and rising most rapidly in heavily urbanized areas, where intuition
suggests that professional standards are highest.35
Although it is implausible that greater sophistication in medical science
would be matched by a sharp decline in practice standards, it is possible that
advances in medical procedures and technology increased the risk of
iatrogenic injury.3 6 One possibility is that the costs of iatrogenic injury
brought on by new procedures and technology exceeded the therapeutic
benefits, implying that use of these innovations was legally negligent under
Judge Learned Hand's familiar test. 37 More likely, however, there was not a
higher incidence of negligence but simply increased risk exposure attributable
to the use of more dangerous but generally beneficial methods. It is plausible
that malpractice suits increased in relation to these new iatrogenic risks, either
because inevitable injuries triggered claims without regard to actual
negligence or because the new complexity made an increase in negligence
inevitable. In any event, the seemingly paradoxical result was that an increase
in medical sophistication produced more claims for malpractice.
The judgment that increasing medical sophistication results in greater
malpractice losses is consistent with the fact that malpractice claims most
often result from surgical and related treatments, 38 the type of higher-risk
35. See Reder, Medical Malpractice: An Economist's View, 1976 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 511, 526
(1976).
36. See L. LANDER, DEFECTIVE MEDICINE: RISK, ANGER, AND THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS 36-56
(1978).
37. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Brown, Toward an
Economic Theory ofLiablity, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD.
29, 32-33 (1972). Strictly speaking, the suggestion in the text goes beyond the Hand-Posner-Brown
negligence formulation insofar as it implies that the level of activity is another factor in the calculus.
The conventional interpretation of that calculus does not include activity level as a variable. See
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). There is no reason for this result,
however. Where iatrogenic risk exposure is correlated to level of health care services, the Hand-
Posner-Brown test could determine whether the increased risk of additional health care was cost-
justified-quite independent of any reasonableness assessment of precautions taken in connection
with those services.
38. Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System, in HEW REPORT, supra note 3, at
app. 87, 150. Their survey of appellate cases between 1950 and 1971 found that over 57% of claims
involved surgical treatment. Other studies corroborate their findings, although the data are not all
precisely similar. See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 65 (1977) (59.5% of
claims paid betweenJuly 1975 andJune 1976 involved surgical or related procedures); ST. PAUL FIRE
& MARINE INS. Co., MALPRACTICE DIGEST, December 1982, at 3 (a list of 20 most-often-cited
allegations of malpractice in claims made against physicians insured by St. Paul Marine and Fire Co.;
surgical treatment implicated in over half of the claims classified on the list).
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procedures that have burgeoned in recent years.39 In addition, more than
seventy-five percent of claims arise from injuries suffered in hospitals, 40 which
are the site of the most sophisticated therapies and which came to be used
more intensively during the period when the malpractice crisis was brewing. 4 1
Another high-risk treatment that ranks near the top in generating malpractice
claims is pharmaceutical therapy,42 which also has increased significantly in
use in recent years just as, coincidentally, drugs and their effects have become
more complex. 43 Not only does the increase in "high tech" health care
plausibly increase patients' exposure to the risk of "mistakes" (that is, injuries
for which there is a credible legal claim for malpractice), but it may also
produce more serious injuries than older forms of treatment, increasing the
size of awards and making malpractice claims more attractive investments for
patients and lawyers.
Admittedly, among the procedures or treatments frequently cited in
malpractice claims are several that do not on their face appear to involve new
or complex treatments. These include failure to diagnose fracture, improper
treatment of fracture, improper treatment of infection, and birth-related
problems.44 Despite the continued prominence of such claims, however, the
greater exposure to iatrogenic injury from the high-risk procedures could
alone increase the claims rate significantly.
The search for explanations of increased malpractice litigation has
provoked considerable sociological speculation that changing public attitudes
contributed to the change. Although greater public unhappiness with medical
care in general and with conspicuously affluent medical practitioners has been
often mentioned as a factor,45 this claim is hard to evaluate.46 A related
explanation attributes this alleged public disaffection to the increased
39. L. LANDER, supra note 36, at 50-51 (hospital statistics showed an increase from 61 to 95 in
number of operations performed per 1000 people over the period from 1949 to 1975-a jump of
over 50%).
40. An HEW sponsored study of claims closed in 1970 reported 80% of claims and 84% of
dollars awarded involved injuries occurring in hospitals. OFFICE OF STATISTICAL RESEARCH, NAT'L
CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLOSED CLAIM STUDY-1976, at 4-7 (1978).
Other studies report somewhat smaller percentages. See id. at 4-2; S. LAw & S. POLAN, supra note 2, at
53.
41. See L. LANDER, supra note 36, at 17 (annual rate of admissions to hospitals increased 50%
during 1950-1974). It should be emphasized that a significant percentage of injuries in hospitals do
not arise directly from medical treatment, but from various institutional factors (such as patients
falling as a consequence of neglect or equipment failure). The 1976 closed claim study sponsored by
the National Center for Health Statistics reported that 47% of hospital injury claims involving awards
of $500 or more cited institutional factors as causes. OFFICE OF STATISTICAL RESEARCH, NAT'L
CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 40, at 4-9. Other cited causes were: drug related, 11%;
procedure related, 54%; anesthetic related 6%; and diagnostic related, 20%. The aggregate
percentages exceeded 100% because more than one factor was cited for some claims. Id.
42. See ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS. Co., supra note 38, at 3 ("drug side effect" and "incorrect
drug" list respectively as the 10th and 18th most common allegations of malpractice claims).
43. See L. LANDER, supra note 36, at 44-50.
44. See ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS. Co., supra note 38, at 3.
45. See, e.g., BUREAU OF INS. VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, supra note 4, at 54; L. LANDER, s11pra note
36, at 92-100;James, Medical Malpractice Insurance: A Consideration of Some of the Factors, 128 RADIOLOGY
837, 838 (1978).
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commercialization, and corresponding depersonalization, of medical care. By
one account,
[t]he developing character of modern medical practice has made the doctor-patient
dyad less and less a healing relationship and more and more a market transaction;
thus, the commodification of healing. The process involves both discrete exchanges
replacing ongoing associations and technocrats engaged in commerce replacing
healers engaged in a calling, both things replacing human relatedness and economics
replacing ethics. Aspects of commodification attach to the patient, to what happens to
the patient in the name of medical treatments, and even to the doctor .... Just as a
commercial for a car or a detergent is selling both a product and the lure of success
and happiness, or just as a hairdresser is selling both a service and an aura of beauty,
so the modern doctor is selling both medical treatment and the expectation of that
amorphous quality we call health .... Health becomes a thing rather than a way of
living, and the doctor becomes a purveyor (and the patient a consumer) of things-
pills and procedures-rather than a participant in a way of relating.4 7
Although exaggerated, this complaint is a fair sample of a genre of criticism
leveled at modern health care. Evidence supporting this explanation is
heavily anecdotal, and the anecdotes are somewhat at odds with the relatively
high rating of public confidence in the medical profession reported by general
public opinion polls. Although such polls show some decline in the absolute
level of public confidence in the profession during recent years, this appears
merely to mirror disaffection with all public institutions; relative to other
groups or institutions, the medical profession is still highly rated in
confidence surveys. 48
The general public may, of course, be the wrong universe to measure. A
more discriminating approach would be to survey the attitudes of those who
have had repeated or significant encounters with the profession. Some
surveys have gathered such evidence, with rather paradoxical results. On the
one hand, the surveys show considerable dissatisfaction with hospital and
medical treatment; yet even persons who believed they had been injured as a
consequence of their poor treatment seldom contemplated filing a
malpractice claim. 4 11 This latter fact is consistent with other studies showing
46. See Reder, supra note 35, at 528-29 (explanation must be relegated to the category of
"interesting but unusable" variables because there is no practicable way of' measuring this shift in
patient attitudes).
47. L. LANDER, supra note 36, at 92-95. For more in this vein (although not specifically in the
context of malpractice), see I. ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH (1975);
Fox, The 11edicalization and Demedicalization of lmencan Societv, in DOING BETTER AND FEELING WORSE:
HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 9-22 U. Knowles ed. 1977).
48. See N.Y. Times, June 12, 1977, at 55, col. I (reporting the results of a I.ouis Harris poll
showing a decline in the percentage of people expressing a "great deal" of confidence in the medical
profession from 73% in 1966 to 43% in 1977 but also reporting similar decline in public confidence
in the federal government and interpreting both trends as disaffection with public institutions
generally). It is noteworthy that, relative to other public institutions, the medical profession
apparently enjoys a higher degree of public confidence than virtually any other. A 1978 Harris poll
reported a much higher degree of public confidence in the medical profession than in the President,
the press, the Supreme Court, the military, big business, local government, state government, law
firms, Congress, organized labor, and advertising agencies. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1978, at 15, col. I.
49. See Peterson, Consumers" Knowledge of andAttitudes Toward Medical lalpractice, in HEW REPORT,
supra note 3, at app. 653, 669, 674-75 (of the surveyed population who reported "negative medical
care experience," only eight percent even considered seeking legal advice on the possibility of legal
action, and of the number who considered it, fewer than half actually did seek advice).
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that malpractice claims represent only a small percentage of iatrogenic
injuries-even of iatrogenic injuries probably caused by negligence.50
It seems more plausible, and more consistent with the attitudes just
reported, that the propensity to file claims is associated not with public
disaffection in some absolute sense but with modern expectations. This
explanation reinforces, and is reinforced by, the comments made earlier about
the increasing sophistication of medical care; greater regard for medical
science would naturally generate increased reliance, which in turn would
intensify the degree of disappointment whenever therapy was injurious. 5'
Moreover, rising expectations with regard to medical care were also implicit
in the political climate of the 1960's, which produced the Medicare and
Medicaid programs and prompted a widespread belief in a so-called "right to
health care." It is not implausible that the social and political attitudes of that
era, which included a loss of public respect for professional and other elites,
would translate into a greater willingness of patients to sue their doctors and a
greater receptivity of judges and juries to their claims.
A common assertion, especially in the medical community, is that the
increase in malpractice claims in the 1960's or 1970's was the product of more
aggressive pursuit of these claims by lawyers. 52 To distinguish it from the
"demand-side" explanations for the malpractice crisis that were examined
above, this one can be labeled a "supply-side" explanation. Although the
"supply-side" argument is typically presented in a polemical fashion that does
not invite a studied response, it should not be dismissed out of hand. The
"supply side" does require attention, because lawyer services are an essential
factor in the production of malpractice claims. As with any factor of
production, the quantity of legal inputs provided is a function of both demand
and supply. The contingent-fee system in particular makes the lawyer not
merely a supplier of services but also an investor. As such, he adjusts his
50. The HEW Secretary's Commission estimated that in 1970 there was one incident of
malpractice per 158,000 patient visits, but only one claim per 226,000 visits. HEW REPORT, supra
note 3, at 12. Other studies show similar disparity between potentially compensable events and
claims made. See, e.g., CAL. MEDICAL Ass'N AND CAL. HOSPITAL ASS'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL
INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY 103-05 (D. Mills ed. 1977) (of potentially compensable events in
California in 1974, only about one-fourth resulted in tort liability); Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, The
Incidence of latrogenic Injuries, in HEW REPORT, supra note 3, at app. 50 (a study of injuries in two
hospitals: out of 517 cases of negligently caused injuries, only 31 claims were filed). See generaltv
Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1282, 1286 (1978)
(estimating that the ratio of claims to incidents of malpractice "could be as high as 0.3 or less than
0.1").
51. Rising public expectations for medical treatment is commonly cited as a causal factor
underlying modern malpractice litigation. See, e.g., HEW REPORT, supra note 3, at 70; Rubsamen,
Medical Malpractice, Sci. AM., Aug. 1976, at 18. The recital of public expectations in both of the above
reports adds that they are "exaggerated" and "unjustified" in relation to the capabilities of modern
medicine. This sentiment is common in the medical literature on the subject. See, e.g., Am. Surgical
Ass'n, Statement on Professional Liability, 295 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1292, 1294 (1976). However, the
characterization of rising expectations as "exaggerated" or "unjustified" presupposes the existence
of some determinate number of justifiable malpractice claims that has been exceeded. There is no
basis for such an assumption.
52. See, e.g., Pabst, A Medical Opinion Survey, of Physicians'Attitudes on Medical Malpractice, in HEW
REPORT, supra note 3, at app. 83, 84.
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investment in a particular project (malpractice cases, products liability cases,
corporate takeovers, and so forth) according to his expected returns relative
to the effort called for and the attractiveness of other opportunities. 53
However, this economic commonplace, in itself, cannot explain the
increase in malpractice claims in the absence of some credible evidence of
exogenous changes in the supply of lawyers or in their investment
opportunities. With regard to the supply of lawyers, one possibility is that a
general increase in the number of lawyers during this period made lawyers
more willing to take marginal cases. There is, however, no evidence linking
the substantial increase in lawyers per capita to increased entry into medical
malpractice, prompting more vigorous pursuit of marginal claims. 54 With
regard to altered investment opportunities, it was occasionally suggested that
tort lawyers targeted the medical malpractice field when the passage of no-
fault insurance in the later 1960's and early 1970's deprived them of litigation
opportunities in the auto accident field. 55 However, fewer than half the states
adopted no-fault in any form, and it is unlikely that malpractice claims in other
states would have been influenced by those enactments. 56 Moreover, in all of
the no-fault states tort remedies were only partially displaced, and most no-
fault limits were set so low that they would displace only minor liability claims
of little or no interest to entrepreneurial lawyers. 57 Finally, California, a
leading state in the production of malpractice claims, 58 never adopted an
automobile no-fault plan.
In any event, looking for explanations of the malpractice crisis in
exogenous events affecting lawyers' behavior neglects the question of why
they shifted their attention disproportionately to malpractice cases. 59 To
53. See Reder, supra note 35, at 529. Reder observes that, at the margin, the returns from the
different opportunities will be equalized (after allowance, for example, for the frictional costs of
adjusting from one practice to another).
54. Despite the reported 70% increase in the number of lawyers between 1950 and 1980,
lawyers' earnings increased relative to other salaried male workers. P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND
SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 12 n.6 (The Rand Corp., Report No. R-2870-ICJ/HCFA,
1982). This would seem to imply the absence of strong financial pressure to pursue marginal claims.
55. See id. at 28-29 (reporting and rejecting the claim).
56. Of those states adopting no-fault plans, about half do not materially affect tort law since they
do not displace tort actions but merely provide for additional first-party insurance coverage (so-
called "add-on" schemes). For a survey of the plans, see Henderson, \'o-Faul Insurancefor Automobile
Accidents: Status and Effect in the United States, 56 OR. L. REV. 287 (1977).
57. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.731, 627.736 (West 1984) (benefits up to $10,000); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34M (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985) (no-fault benefits up to $2,000). In addition,
the tort action typically is preserved for pain and suffering in cases where medical expenses exceed a
certain set amount or where the injury results in death, disfigurement, or dismemberment. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (West 1985) (tort action for noneconomic loss where medical costs exceed
$200); N.Y. INS. LAW, §§ 5102(d), 5104 (McKinney 1985) (tort action for noneconomic loss in case
of "serious injury" defined as death, disfigurement, loss of use of internal organ, etc.).
58. See AM. MEDICAL Ass'N, MALPRACTICE IN Focus 13-15 (1975).
59. One thinks particularly of products liability actions as an alternative investment of energies.
To be sure, products liability suits have grown apace-to the point where they have evoked cries of
"crisis" from industry and led to a national study commission. SeeJ. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE
TORTS PROCESS 800-801 (2d ed. 1981). However, the increased investment by lawyers in products
liability actions apparently has not been at the expense of medical malpractice actions. One possible
reason concerns the different investment costs for the two types of cases.
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answer that question one must consider factors affecting the relative earnings
from investments in such claims. 60  The increased attractiveness of
malpractice claims could have resulted either from a reduction in the costs of
pursuing such claims or from an increase in the expected payout. Attention is
thus directed to the legal developments of the 1960's and early 1970's that
facilitated the bringing of malpractice suits and increased both the likelihood
and the expected amount of recoveries.
The central target of critics and reformers in the 1970's was the
liberalization of legal rules that was perceived to have occurred and to have
facilitated the initiation of claims and improved the prospects for recoveries.
Despite the common belief among health care professionals that the legal
system is hostile to their interests, however, the procedural and substantive
rules that evolved under the common law have been extraordinarily protective
of health care professionals, interposing exceptional impediments to tort
litigation and liability. Before the 1960's, absolute immunities for nonprofit
providers blocked some suits altogether, and restrictive statutes of limitations
made no allowance for latent injuries, which are characteristic of many
malpractice cases. The plaintiff who survived these obstacles faced, and to a
considerable degree still faces, the formidable hurdle of a standard of care
that is especially advantageous to health care providers.
With certain exceptions, the law allows the medical community to establish
its own liability standards. Plaintiffs must prove, through expert testimony,
that the care or skill exercised by a defendant physician was below that
customarily exercised by comparable professionals in the community."' This
protective, provider-defined standard of care was traditionally conjoined with
a narrow definition of "community.- 62 One effect of this traditional "locality
rule" was to insulate local professionals from forced adherence to higher
standards prevalent in other areas. However, that effect could be significant
only where a whole community of practitioners lagged behind current medical
learning. The rule's greater importance lay in its constriction of the pool of
professionals qualified to testify as to the relevant standards of practice. In
addition, requiring expert witnesses to be drawn from the particular
community meant that the eligible professionals might be reluctant to testify,
fearing that they would antagonize local colleagues or incur censure from
local medical groups. The locality rule thus reinforced general medical
60. It appears that no one has attempted to obtain the requisite empirical information to
measure the returns from malpractice cases relative to other liability actions. For a general
investigation of the economic dynamics of malpractice litigation, see Danzon & Lillard, Setlement Oil
of Court: The Disposition of Medical Alalpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL SrTUD. 345 (1983). See aso Dietz,
Baird & Berul, supra note 38, at 113-20 (analysis of contingent fees and their effect).
61. See generally McCoid, The Care Reqiired of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549 (1959).
62. The locality rule has been variously defined. In some jurisdictions, it means the required
standard of care is measured by customary practice in the "same" communiy: in others it denotes
the "same or similar" community. See id. at 569-75. The "similar community" standard is capable of
more flexibility than the "same community" standard, depending on the size and characteristics of
the community of practice.
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opposition to legal intervention in health care matters and facilitated the
infamous "conspiracy of silence."
63
Modern times-beginning roughly in the 1960's-witnessed liberalization
of substantive standards and procedural rules governing medical malpractice
cases. Substantively, the principal modifications involved negligence
standards, particularly the elimination or relaxation of the locality rule,64
standards for informed consent, 65 and the scope of the doctrine of respondeat
superior.66 Procedurally, the main alterations have been the elimination of
charitable immunity, 67 relaxation of the statute of limitations (most notably by
incorporating a discovery rule to cover latent injuries), 68 and the loosening of
proof requirements, including the necessity for expert testimony and the
availability of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.6' -)
The degree of change in legal doctrine in the decade before the first
appearance of the malpractice crisis may have been exaggerated in the crisis
commentary of the 1970's. A mere listing of modifications in legal rules is
misleading without some empirical assessment of their actual importance in
triggering additional malpractice litigation. At least some rules that were
clearly liberalized appear not to have been significant factors in cases
63. See S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 2, at 99-100.
64. There has been a perceptible trend towards further liberalization of the locality rule,
particularly for medical specialists. See, e.g., Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical .lalpractice Cases, 51
IND. L.J. 528, 538-40 (1976). However, some states have resisted. See, e.g., Butler v. Berkeley, 25
N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975). On the effect of crisis legislation, see infa notes 95-96 and
accompanying text.
65. The rule that a patient must consent to treatment necessitates at least minimal information
disclosure about the nature and consequences of a treatment. However, except for the unusual case
where the patient is totally informed about the character or scope of the procedure, the physician's
obligation to disclose is defined by negligence principles-that is, whether the degree of disclosure
(or nondisclosure) is reasonable in the circumstances. Under traditional rules, reasonableness is
governed by the standards of professional custom as measured by expert medical testimony-just as
for adjudications of the reasonableness of medical treatment. See Pearson, supra note 64, at 542.
Beginning in the 1970's, courts in several states eliminated the professional custom standard (and its
concomitant expert testimony requirement) in favor of more general standards based on what a
reasonable patient would want to know to make an informed choice. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), ceit. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1,
104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). Although this change has been cited widely as significant, see. e.g., Deitz,
Baird & Berul, supra note 38, at 126, two qualifications must be noted: (1) many states have refused
to make the change, and (2) virtually all of the cases instituting this reform occurred in the 1970's-
too late to have generated the claims increase precipitating the "crisis." See Pearson, supra note 64, at
540-45. On the effect of recent legislation, see infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
66. The changes in the respondeat superior doctrine consist of a narrowing of the independent
contractor exception and an expansion of the "borrowed servant" rule. However, in some cases the
hospital is held liable for its own violation of duty, not via respondeat superior. See, e.g., Deitz, Baird
& Berul, supra note 38, at 125.
67. Most states have abolished or substantially curtailed charitable immunity for hospitals. Id. at
138.
68. The critical change had been judicial interpretation of the limitations statutes to toll the
running of limitations until a latent injury was or should have been discovered. Id. at 126-27.
69. The principal relaxation of evidentiary standards involved liberalized locality rules. The
ostensible change in the use of res ipsa loquitur is more problematical. The usual authorities cited to
demonstrate this modification are pro-plaintiff California decisions which were not widely followed in
other jurisdictions. Moreover, res ipsa loquitur was not a dominant factor in a majority of sample
appellate decisions studied by Deitz, Baird & Berul. Id. at 137, 142.
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contributing to the surge in malpractice claims in the 1960's; 70 unfortunately,
no empirical examination of the 1970's crisis adequately addresses this point.
Also, many of the cited legal changes developed gradually so that their impact
should have been less sudden than the sharp spike in claims suggested it was.
Until there are better empirical studies or a workable theoretical model of
how changes in legal rules affect litigation rates, one must be satisfied with an
intuitive assessment. On this basis, it seems certain that liberalization of tort
law and procedure did indeed contribute importantly to the malpractice crisis
of the 1970's. The dramatic changes in the frequency and severity of claims
could not have occurred unless the costs of suing providers were appreciably
reduced or the probability of winning or of winning a large award was
increased. Without such changes in the value of a potential lawsuit,
malpractice victims and their lawyers would not have increased their
aggregate investments in pursuing claims. 7 1 Certainly the nonlegal factors
canvassed above-such as more serious injuries associated with high tech
medical care and changing attitudes on the part of patients, judges, and
juries-also contributed to making malpractice claims more attractive, but
legal doctrine must have had the greatest impact. Indeed, the liberalization of
tort doctrine that occurred was, in the last analysis, a direct manifestation of
the revolution in social attitudes toward medicine and the medical profession
that occurred in the period preceding the malpractice crisis. Law is, after all, a
product of a social milieu. Just as the malpractice crisis of the 1970's was the
result of abrupt changes in social attitudes, the reform efforts that followed,
first in the mid-1970's and now in the 1980's, may best be understood as a
backlash of sorts against what may now be seen as excesses of the 1960's.
IV
RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS
The malpractice crisis of the mid-1970's, perceived as stemming from
flaws in insurance practices, legal rules, and medical practice, produced
apparent reforms in at least the first two areas. As to medical practice, it is
hard to find reliable evidence of significant alteration in therapeutic
procedures. 72 Nevertheless, "risk-management" programs in hospitals may
70. For an attempt to measure the significance of legal rules (based on the frequency with which
they are applied in appellate decisions, or their importance to appeal initiation), see id. at 128-49.
Some of the most controversial legal rules, such as those governing informed consent and res ipsa
loquitur, were more important to plaintiff success in the 1950-1960 time period than in the 1961-
1971 period. This fact suggests that the liberalization of these rules during the period most relevant
to the crisis was not significant. See id. at 137.
71. See id. at 95-102, reporting the results of two surveys. One, a random sampling of private
practice lawyers, showed a 50% rejection rate for cases brought to them. The other, a survey of
lawyers specializing in malpractice litigation, showed a rejection rate of just under 30%. In both
surveys, the most commonly given reason for rejection was the probable absence of liability. A
significant number also reported "economic reasons" for rejecting cases. Id. at 97. Presumably
"economic reasons" translates to a probability that liability would not yield a recovery for damages
sufficient to justify investment in pursuing the claim.
72. The "defensive medicine" claim is examined in Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of.lledical
Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173, 175-80.
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have improved patient care in some respects, and peer review and regulatory
mechanisms have been strengthened in many places, often as a result of
statutory tightening aimed at improved quality assurance.
One important development in malpractice insurance was the withdrawal,
noted earlier, of some companies from the malpractice market. 73 Although
this development contributed to the crisis at the time, the departure of
marginal firms not fully committed to this line of insurance reflected efficient
market discipline. The gap left by their departure was filled by newly formed
mutual insurance companies owned and operated by medical groups. These
provider-owned companies now hold a considerable share of the malpractice
market.74
As an emergency measure, most states also authorized the creation of
either special "joint underwriting associations" (JUA's) or "reinsurance
exchanges" to provide coverage for health care professionals unable to obtain
it from the private market. 75 Under the typical JUA legislation, all companies
writing liability insurance of any kind within the state were required to form a
cash reserve pool for underwriting malpractice risks. 76 Generally conceived
as temporary measures, most JUA plans have since expired by the terms of
their creation. However, a few are still active and remain an important source
of underwriting in some states. 77 A reinsurance exchange is similar to the
JUA except that the administration and underwriting responsibilities remain
with individual malpractice insurers, which are reinsured by the exchange for
risks beyond a certain amount. 78
Mere changes in the underwriting entity did not, and could not, address
the critical underlying problems of malpractice insurance practices. Shifting
from a for-profit to a nonprofit form of enterprise was simply an expedient
means of temporarily absorbing the losses from underwriting; it could not
eliminate the losses, or correct for the problem of unanticipated cost
increases. Focusing on the "long tail" problem and its effect on the reliability
of actuarial predictions of future liability,7 9 insurers began to reconsider their
practice of writing policies on an "occurrence" basis, covering all claims,
whenever filed, arising out of care rendered during the policy year. By
shifting to "claims-made" policies covering the insured only for claims filed in
the policy year, the "long tail" problem would be alleviated. In contrast to
occurrence policies, which require the carrier to forecast risk exposure as far
as a decade into the future, the claims-made policy can more safely base rates
73. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
74. Since 1975, professionally-sponsored insurance companies have captured more than 50% of
the malpractice business nationwide and rank among the top three underwriters in 26 of 51
jurisdictions. General Liabilityl/Medical Aalpractice Insurance Aarketing-1982, BEST'S REV., Oct. 1983,
at 4-5.
75. For a list of states enacting legislation through 1976, see 5 AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, STATE
HEALTH LEGISLATION REPORT 11 (1977).
76. For a more extended description, see Grossman, supra note 4, at 4-5.
77. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAw § 5501-15 (McKinney 1985).
78. See Grossman, supra note 4, at 5.
79. See, e.g., HEW REPORT, supra note 3, at 42; Roddis & Stewart, supra note 11, at 1295.
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on current claims experience. The increase in actuarial accuracy promotes
rate stability and, by reducing reserve requirements, permits lower current
rates.
Following the lead of the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company,
most carriers switched to claims-made policies in the 1970's.80 The medical
profession initially opposed the change, primarily because it required
physicians to purchase a costly "reporting endorsement" for claims filed after
their retirement from active practice. That opposition was overcome,
however, when many carriers refused to offer malpractice insurance on any
other basis. Today, claims-made policies have been widely adopted even
among provider-owned carriers, 8 ' although occurrence policies are still
available in some places.8 2
Innovations in insurance practices alone could not, of course, alter the
incidence or the severity of claims, the driving force behind increased
underwriting costs. Because the crisis involved long-run trends in insurance
costs as well as the availability of insurance, attention was directed at ways of
reducing the frequency and severity of claims. The medical profession urged
state legislatures across the country to halt or reverse the liberalization trend
by shoring up or imposing new constraints on malpractice actions. A first
glance at the flood of legislation enacted nationwide makes it appear that the
legislatures were responsive to the doctors' cris du coeur. Yet the torrent of
legislative words is not an accurate indication of their actual effect. An
examination of the significance of the reforms will follow a summary of the
types of measures taken.8 3
It should be noted at the outset that in many states reform legislation has
been held unconstitutional in whole8 4 or in part 85 on substantive due process
80. See S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 2, at 186-88.
81. Id. at 187.
82. A 1982 breakdown of provider-owned carriers shows a nearly even split between companies
writing claims-made and those writing occurrence policies. See BEST'S INSURANCE MANAGEMENT
REPORTS, PROPERTY/CASUALTY RELEASE No.9 (Apr. 4, 1983).
83. There are several summaries of reforms taken; unfortunately, they differ somewhat in their
lists of states enacting reforms. Also, some inaccuracies exist in all of them. The most extensive
summary is given in the AMA's periodic survey of legislation. The main "crisis" legislation is
summarized in 5 AM. MEDICAL Ass'N, AMA STATE HEALTH LEGISLATION REPORT (1977). It was
supplemented in December 1977, and has been periodically updated since then. A more limited, but
still very useful summary is found in P. DANZON, supra note 54, app. A.
84. SeeJones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) (remanding for trial
court findings on whether a crisis existed), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Carson v. Maurer, 120
N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (minor features of the statute upheld); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125 (N.D. 1978) (a separate screening panel law was not challenged).
85. The following is a partial listing of decisions holding particular reforms unconstitutional,
exclusive of the cases in supra note 84. Collateral Source Rule Alodification: Doran v. Priddy, 534 F.
Supp. 30 (D. Kan. 1981); Graley v. Satavatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976).
Damages Limitations: Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976);
Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Simon v. St. Elizabeth's Medical
Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976). Limitation on Contingent Fees: Heller v. Frankston,
76 Pa. Commw. 294, 464 A.2d 581 (1983). Pretnal Screening Panels: Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231
(Fla. 1980); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980); Boucher v. Sayeed, - R.I. -
-, 459 A.2d 87 (1983). Required Posting of Bond Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744
(1977); Nork v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 997, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1978). Shorter Statutes of
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or equal protection grounds.8 6  The constitutional cases do raise the
interesting, and largely unanswered, question whether the alleged malpractice
crisis was sufficiently real in the particular state to justify extraordinary
legislative measures; a similar issue was whether problems constituting the
malpractice crisis were distinct enough from problems afflicting other fields of
personal injury law to warrant singling it out for special, arguably
discriminatory, attention. To explore these questions would take us rather far
afield. It must suffice to observe that most states have rejected constitutional
challenges, at least implicitly giving an affirmative answer to both questions. s7
Legislation in the malpractice area can be classified according to its
immediate thrust: rules directed at the initiation of claims, those affecting the
standard of care and proof of breach, and those affecting the amount
recoverable. This classification is somewhat arbitrary because the different
rules are interactive. Obviously, a limit on the amount recoverable will
discourage the bringing of claims and a limit on bringing claims affects the
amount recoverable.
One set of legislative enactments modified applicable statutes of
limitations. Prior to the 1970's, courts in most states had adopted the
"discovery rule," under which the statute of limitations was tolled for latent
injuries that could not have been discovered by reasonable effort. Because
this rule exposed providers to suits based on old evidence and possibly to new
standards of liability not in effect when care was rendered, a majority of states
put limits on the discovery principle. In a few states the discovery rule was
eliminated altogether, so that the limitations period commenced with the act
or omission exclusively.8 8 Most states enacted either a general discovery
Limitatioi: Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961, (1984); Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231
(Fla. 1980); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
86. Most of the courts have employed an ordinary "rational basis" test to determine whether
medical malpractice cases warranted special treatment because of the "malpractice crisis." However,
some courts have applied a more rigorous test, or at least have applied the rational basis test more
rigorotIsly than the Supreme Court would have done. For example, in Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H.
925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). the court explicitly adopted a "more rigorous" test that required a "fair
and substantial relation" between the legislative purpose and the special treatment of medical
malpractice claims. Id. 120 N.H at 932, 424 A.2d at 830-31. In Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op.
2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976), the court appears to have employed the even more rigorous test
which requires the classifications to be justified by a "compelling governmental interest." Id. 74
Ohio Op. 2d at 319, 343 N.E.2d at 837. InJones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d
399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the constitutional
issue to the trial court to make findings on the key factual assumptions underlying the legislation. On
remand the trial court held that, applying a rational basis test, the legislation did not violate due
process or equal protection. However, it interpreted the remand order to require a more rigorous
"means scrutiny" test under which there was insufficient factual basis for the reforms adopted. Jones
v. State Bd. of Medicine, Nos. 55527, 55586 (4th Dist. Idaho, 1980).
87. For a list of decisions, see American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-
Saratoga, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 350, 370 n.10, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n.10, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 678 n.10
(1984).
88. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6856 (1984) (two years from injury, unless injury could not
have been discovered within two years, in which case three years from injury; exception for child
under six); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns 1983) (two years from injury; exception only for
child under six): N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4 1-5-13 (1978) (three years from injury; exception only for child
tinder six); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 15-2-14.1 (1984) (two years; no exceptions).
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rule,8 9 or a special discovery rule for cases involving a foreign substance in the
body or fraudulent concealment.9 0 However, in all but a few instances, the
discovery rule was given a fixed outer time limit, ranging between three and
ten years, with a special provision usually made for minors.9 1 Although these
reforms were ostensibly directed at the "long-tail" problem, one would
expect them also to curtail the number of claims, discriminating particularly
against cases involving failure to diagnose and cases involving latent injuries.
Another reform designed principally to curb claims initiation involved
regulation of lawyers' contingent fees. Contingent fees have been the eternal
nemesis of those who consider themselves victims of aggressive lawyering.
Although regulation of prices has traditionally been adopted to offset the
absence of price competition in a market, the purpose of contingent fee
regulation is not to protect consumers against monopolistic price gouging but
to protect defendants and their insurers against malpractice suits. The
perception inspiring such regulation was that contingent fees induce lawyers
to bring unwarranted lawsuits, to seek exaggerated damages, and not to settle
claims for reasonable amounts. Most states responding to that notion simply
authorized judicial control of fees, although some went further and adopted
limits on the percentage of the award that the lawyer could claim; the
statutorily prescribed percentages generally diminish as the size of the award
increases .92
89. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1975) (two years from injury or six months from discovery,
but no later than four years from act); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982) (three years from
injury or one year from discovery); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-105 (1984) (two years from injury or
from discovery; no later than three years from injury except in cases involving foreign substances in
body, knowing concealment, or a suit brought by a child); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95:11 (West 1982) (two
years from injury or discovery, but no later than four years except for concealment or
misrepresentation, in which case two years from discovery, but no later than seven years); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 657-7.3 (1968) (two years from injury or discovery, but no later than six years from
injury except for failure to disclose); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-212 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (two years
from injury or discovery, but no later than four years from injury); MD. CTs. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 5-109 (1984) (five years from injury or three years from discovery, whichever first occurs); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5805(4), 600.5838 (1985) (two years from period treatment is
discontinued or six months from discovery); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (1984) (two years from
injury or discovery); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-205 (1984) (three years from injury or discovery, but
no later than five years from injury, except for failure to disclose); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1979)
(two years from injury or one year from discovery, but no later than ten years from injury); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 18 (West 1984) (two years from injury or discovery, but no later than three years
from injury); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116 (1980) (one year from injury or discovery, but no later
than three years from injury except for concealment or foreign substance in body); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.16.350 (1985) (three years from injury or one year from discovery, but no later than eight years
from injury).
90. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-564 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2616 (1983); GA.
CODE § 9-3-72 (1982); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 214-a (McKinney 1984).
91. See statutes cited supra note 89. Exceptional statutes which impose no outer limit include:
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-564 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2616 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.1
(1984). Some states that did not modify or enact new statutes of limitation for malpractice retain an
open-ended discovery rule. See, e.g., Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 411 N.E.2d 458 (1980); Stein
v. Richardson, 302 Pa. Super. 124, 448 A.2d 558 (1982).
92. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (1982) (court, on request for either party, shall
determine reasonableness of both contingent and fixed fees); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West
1985) (fixed limits ranging from 40% on first $50,000 to maximum of 10% on recoveries over
$200,000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (1984) (fixed limits: 35% on first $100,000 damages, 25%
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A similar desire to curb artificial stimulation of lawsuits also probably
underlay another common legislative reform, the elimination of the ad
damnum clause in complaints alleging medical malpractice. 93 The ostensible
rationale for this measure was the elimination of harmful and often
misleading publicity. In fact, the real concern was probably that the publicity
given to large but as yet unsubstantiated claims encouraged more claims to be
filed and encouraged larger jury awards. 94
In regard to standards of care and proof of breach, there were three
principal reform targets: the locality rule, the standard for informed consent,
and the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a substitute for affirmative
evidence of negligence. Each targeted reform ostensibly attempted to
reverse, or at least to freeze, liberalization of the law by common law courts.
As observed earlier, the principal effect ofjudicial expansion of the locality
rule was to widen plaintiffs' access to expert witnesses, particularly to
witnesses who were not subject to sanctions by the local medical community.
Despite its salience, however, statutory reform of the locality rule was not
widespread. Fewer than a dozen states dealt with the geographical standard
generally, and these states usually did no more than codify the common law
standards prevailing in the jurisdiction. In most instances, the "same or
similar community" standard was adopted, albeit with some variation in
phrasing.9 5 The vagueness of this formulation permits a wide range ofjudicial
discretion both in defining the standard and in qualifying witnesses. It
appears that courts have responded with expansive interpretations. 9 6 The
medical profession has not been given .the opportunity to reestablish the once
notorious "conspiracy of silence."
on second $100,000, 10% on remainder). In Florida, the statute allows the court to award
"reasonable" attorney's fees to the prevailing party. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56 (West 1985). This
solution would seem to have a more powerful effect than merely constraining contingent fees to
correct any propensity to pursue speculative claims.
93. See, e.g., MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02(b) (1984); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
231, § 60C (West 1985).
94. P. DANZON, supra note 54, at 39.
95. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-484 (1975) ("same general neighborhood"); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.540 (1973) ("similar communities"); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2614 (1983) ("similar locality");
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.43 (West 1985) ("same or similar community"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-
2794A (West 1985) ("similar community"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 (1980) ("same or similar
community"); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (1974) (average practitioner in "same or similar
circumstances"). In Arizona, the statute confines the geographical reference to the state. ARIz. REV.
STAT ANN. § 12-563 (1983). In Virginia, the statute requires reference to the state standard except
where "same or similar community" would be more appropriate. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.20 (1984). In
Delaware, the statute limits expert testimony to those familiar with local standards, but this has not
apparently restricted the prior "similar community" standard. See Butler v. Alatur, 419 A.2d 938
(Del. 1980). Only one statute sought to reinstate the strict "same" community standard for the older
common law. IDAHO CODE § 6-1012 (1979). It has been held unconstitutional. Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
96. See, e.g., May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596, 602 (Ala. 1982) (same general neighborhood refers
to "national medical community"); Butler v. Alatur, 419 A.2d 938, 939-40 (Del. 1980) (qualified
experts not limited to state practitioners despite statutory requirement that experts be familiar with
local standards); Mitchell v. Angelo, 416 So.2d 910, 912-13 (Fla. 1982) ("same or similar
community" embraces a national standard for specialists).
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Informed consent reforms were more widespread, though quite variable.
Approximately twenty-two states enacted provisions dealing in some way with
the issue.'97 Most of the statutes essentially codified the traditional standard of
disclosure, which defines appropriate disclosure by reference to professional
custom. 98 The more modern, liberal standard, allowing the jury to assess the
patient's need for information in order to make an informed choice, was
enacted in several states. 99 In still other instances, the statute simply
prescribes information to be included in written consent forms, leaving the
effect for liability purposes unspecified.' 00 Finally, there are some statutes
that defy easy categorization. 10'
The use of the principle of res ipsa loquitur has long been one of the most
controversial issues in the law of medical malpractice. Hence, it is a little
surprising that it was the subject of reform legislation in only a few states-
probably less than ten. Cataloging pertinent statutes is problematic given the
ambiguity of some of them in addressing the general issue of proof burdens
without obviously or necessarily affecting the use of res ipsa loquitur. For
example, several states that are cited as having legislated on the subject
merely enacted statutes specifying that the plaintiff has the burden of proving
the absence of customary care or skill.' 0 2 Such provisions do not necessarily
affect the use of res ipsa loquitur because that doctrine alters neither the
general standard of care nor the plaintiff's burden of proof. Instead, res ipsa
loquitur affects the character and sufficiency of evidence necessary to make a
97. One source, P. Danzon, supra note 54, at 42, lists 23 states. However, in one of them,
California, no pertinent statute could be found.
98. On the common law of informed consent see supra note 65. The following statutes are
illustrative: ALASKA STAT. § 09155.556 (1973) (physician must disclose "common risks and
reasonable alternatives"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (1984) (reasonable physician/medical
custom); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.46 (West 1985) (same); IDAHO CODE § 39-4304-5 (1977) (same); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905 (Supp. 1985) (reasonable physician); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A. l10
(1979) (consent presumed if physician generally explains risks and alternatives); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-C:2 (1983) (medical custom); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805(d)(1) (McKinney 1977)
(reasonable physician); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4401-(a) (McKinney 1984) (requires expert
testimony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (1980) (reasonable physician/custom); TEX. REV. CIX.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590i:602 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
99. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Purdon 1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050
(1974); see also statutes cited infia note 100.
100. IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (West 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40 (West 1977);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (Baldwin 1984). The Louisiana statute has been interpreted to
incorporate the patient needs standard. LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039, 1048 (La. 1983).
101. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-32 (1984) (issue of informed consent a preliminary question
for the court); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1977) (patient must prove he was not informed of
"substantial and significant risk").
102. For example, of the 15 states identified in P. DANZON, supra note 54, at 45, as having enacted
legislation on res ipsa loquitur, six enacted statutes of this broad character. ALA. CODE § 6-5-484
(1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-563 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2614 (1983); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2912(a) (1985) (specifically construed in Sullivan v. Russell, 417 Mich. 398, 338
N.W.2d 181 (1983), not to affect res ipsa loquitur); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1908 (Supp. 1985);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.040 (1974). ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.540 (1973) may be construed to
limit res ipsa loquitur because it provides that there shall be no presumption of negligence. See Priest
v. Lindig, 583 P.2d 173 (Alaska 1978) (dictum). However, since res ipsa loquitur is usually treated
not as a presumption, but as a circumstantial inference from certain proved facts, it is a bit strained to
interpret this statute as affecting res ipsa loquitur.
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prima facie case, an issue that the described provisions do not explicitly
address. Of those statutes that do mention res ipsa loquitur, two abolish it,' 0 3
three restrict its use to specified cases, 10 4 and four either explicitly ratify the
common law doctrine or address minor procedural aspects.' 0 5
In addition to legislating on the standard of care or the burden of proof,
many states established a scheme for expert review or mediation of claims as a
prerequisite for judicial trial.' 0t The features of these pretrial schemes vary,
but the statutes typically call for a review of the evidence by a panel comprised
of medical-legal experts and sometimes lay persons. The panel's report and
opinion on the claim is sometimes made admissible in evidence, but it is never
conclusive. 1117 The goal in establishing such screening panels was to improve
the quality of fault-finding by the system and thus both to discourage the
bringing of questionable claims and to encourage the settlement of valid ones.
Increases in damages recovered were often cited as dramatic evidence of
the malpractice crisis. Several states attempted to deal with this problem by
fixing ceilings on amounts recoverable.' 0 8 Some states limited the amount to
103. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1012 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:2(III) (1983). New
Hampshire's statute was held unconstitutional, as was a predecessor to the Idaho statute. See supra
note 84.
104. In three states, Delaware, Florida, and Nevada, the statutes explicitly limit the use ofres ipsa
loquitur to specified exceptional cases. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.45 (West 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.100 (1979). Each of the three statutes allows the
doctrine's use where a foreign object is left in the body during surgery; Delaware and Nevada allow
its use in cases where injury is caused by a fire or explosion in a substance used in treatment, or
injury to a part of the body not involved in treatment. Nevada is slightly more expansive, including
injury to a part of the body not involved in treatment. Although these limitations possibly curtail an
expansive use of res ipsa loquitur, they do incorporate the principal applications of res ipsa loquitur
in malpractice cases, and it is not clear that these applications are affected. See, e.g., Borghese v.
Bartley, 402 So.2d 475, 477, (Fla. 1981) (statute codifies common law); Stepien v. Bay Memorial
Medical Center, 397 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (citing pre-statute res ipsa loquitur
decision Without any mention of the statute in a case concerning negligent custodial care; expert
testimony held not required).
105. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 411.30(d) (West 1985) (exempting res ipsa loquitur cases from
requirement that plaintiffs consult with medical professional before filing suit); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
76,§ 21 (West 1984) (incorporating res ipsa loquitur and making it a presumption); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-19-33 (1984) (merely requires the court to make a preliminary finding of fact that res ipsa
loquitur inference would be reasonable); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 (1980) (codifying res ipsa
loquitur); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 7.01 (Vernon 1986) (expressly codifying common
law, but forbidding any expansion in the scope of its application).
106. For a list of states enacting such legislation see P. DANZON, supra note 54, at 43.
107. For a review of the different screening panel schemes and how they have performed, see P.
CARLIN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PRE-TRIAL SCREENING PANELS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 15-41
(George Washington Univ. Intergovernmental Health Policy Project 1980). Reports on the
performance of these schemes are mixed. In some states there has been criticism that the panels
promote delay without promoting greater settlement than would have been achieved without them.
See, e.g., Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (holding mandatory panels
unconstitutional on this ground); see also Curran, Screening Panels in Malpractice Cases: Some Disturbing
Progiess Reports, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 954 (1980) (reporting findings of a survey showing widespread
dissatisfaction with screening panels even among groups that originally sponsored them); Comment,
A Practical Assessment ofArizonas Medical Malpractice Screening System, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 335 (1984). In
other states opinion has been more favorable. See Curran, supra, at 954-55. Until more rigorous
investigations are conducted as to the effect of panels measured against prepanel outcomes, panel
performance must be considered an unknown.
108. See P. DANZON, supra note 54, at 48. Again, several of these statutes have been overturned on
constitutional grounds. See supra notes 84-85.
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be paid by defendants, with amounts over that ceiling (up to a specified limit)
to be paid from a special fund established by the state and supported by
special surcharges on health care providers. 0 9 Other states limited damages
recoverable from any source, some fixed ceilings on total amounts
recoverable, others limited only noneconomic losses such as pain and
suffering and loss of consortium.' 10
Several states sought to limit recoveries by modifying the collateral source
rule, which permits plaintiffs to recover amounts that they have already been
reimbursed under health, life, or disability insurance or under an employer's
sick-pay plan.''' Reforms have either required collateral source payments to
be offset against awarded damages' 12 or allowed defendants to introduce
evidence of such payments, leaving the jury to decide whether to take those
benefits into account in fixing damages.' "
Some states sought to reduce the cost of claims by allowing or mandating
periodic payments in lieu of lump-sum awards.' ' 4 Although periodic
payments are sometimes rationalized on paternalistic grounds-as a means of
preventing plaintiffs from squandering their awards' 5- the main purpose of
such measures is plainly to save contingent future damages by allowing
defendants or their insurers to retain and invest the unpaid damages and by
cutting off payments in the event of the patient's death.' 16
109. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1983) (limit of $500,000 for death of patient;
liability of any physician limited to $100,000, remainder payable from fund); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.42(B) (West 1985) (same as Indiana); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (1982) (same as Indiana
but exclusive of punitive damages and medical costs).
110. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 1985) ($250,000 limit for "noneconomic" loss);
VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1984) (total recovery limit of $1 million).
11. Abolition or modification of the collateral source rule is a popular target of contemporary
reform efforts. See infra text accompanying notes 142-43.
112. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.50 (West 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West 1985);
Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Baldwin 1984) (collateral sources other than those paid for by
claimant or employer): PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.602 (Purdon 1985) (public collateral
sources only); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119 (1980).
113. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (1984) (public
collateral sources); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4010 (McKinney 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-
12 (1984) (collateral sources not paid for by claimant); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (1974)
(collateral sources not paid, or bargained for, by plaintiff).
114. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980) (periodic payments in lieu of lump sum
at option of either party); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-08(b) (1984) (claimant's option
only); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.015 (West 1980) (periodic payments mandatory for sums over
$25,000). Illinois and New York recently enacted elaborate periodic payment schemes. Medical
Malpractice Act, 1985 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-7, §§ 2-1705 to -1719 (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
§§ 2-1705 to -1719 (Smith-Hurd 1986)); Act of April 15, 1985, 1985 N.Y. Laws, ch. 294, § 9 (codified
at N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 5031-5039 (McKinney Supp. 1986)).
115. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d
359, 369, 683 P.2d 670, 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 677 (1984). See generally Elligett, The Periodic Payment
of Judgments, 46 INS. COUNS. J. 130, 131 (1979).
116. This purpose was acknowledged by the California Supreme Court in American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1984), which rationalized it as eliminating a "windfall" to plaintiffs heirs. Id. 36 Cal. 3d at 369,
683 P.2d at 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 677. Just why economic losses are any more a "windfall" than any
other asset of the decedent was not explained.
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V
WHAT DID THE REFORMS OF THE 1970's ACCOMPLISH?
Although changes in insurance underwriting practices and in legal rules
and standards had the immediate effect of dissipating the crisis atmosphere, a
closer look at these reforms suggests they were less substantive and important
than they first appeared.
Among the changes in the field of malpractice insurance, the general shift
by insurers to claims-made policies was significant only if the "long tail"
phenomenon was an important problem. Although claims-made policies do
reduce actuarial uncertainty, this effect is likely to be slight; only about two
percent of claims are filed more than five years after the event, 1 17 and this
number is likely to be reduced by the new statutes of limitations. The more
important insurance development of the 1970's was the appearance of
provider-owned insurers. These plans, being noncommercial and under the
control of physicians anxious to reduce malpractice costs, have the potential
at least to identify dangerous providers and rectify dangerous situations.
They face the risk, however, that, in order to keep premiums down for the
benefit of their provider-owners, they will adopt overly optimistic
assumptions, undercharge providers, and face bankruptcy if trends disappoint
their expectations.' '8
As to the actual impact of legal reforms, Patricia Danzon has attempted to
analyze how several major reforms affected the frequency and severity of
claims in enacting states.' 19 Her study shows that limitations on recoverable
damages and abolition of the collateral source rule were both positively
correlated with near-term reductions in the severity of claims. Limits on
contingent fees showed "some sign" of having reduced claim severity, but no
other significant positive correlations between the legislation and changes in
claim frequency or severity were found.120
The absence of observable effects for most of the legal reforms of the
1970's may simply reflect the absence of reliable current data to measure
long-term effects, particularly on claims frequency.' 2' However, another
117. A 1974 study by the Insurance Services Office of closed claims found that over 98% of
claims were reported within five years of malpractice occurrence. As Kenneth Abraham put it,
"although the tail is long, it may not be very wide." Abraham, supra note 2, at 503; see also HEW
REPORT, supra note 3, at app. 254 (88% to 95% of all claims reported within first 24 months after
mishap; 97% within 48 months).
118. The problem is most dramatically illustrated by the experience in Florida where the Florida
Physician's Insurance Reciprocal was placed in receivership in 1984. New management and surplus
contributions from insureds have since rehabilitated the carrier. Medical Liability Monitor, Jan. 29,
1985, at 2-3.
119. P. DANZON, supra note 54.
120. Id. at 30-32; see also Sloan, State Responses to the .MIalpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: .41n
Empirical Assessment. 9 J. HEALTH POL., POL'y & L. 629 (1985) (an econometric study of the effect of
reforms on insurance premiums; reforms did not have intended effect of curbing rise in premiums).
121. Danzon analyzed closed claims for the 1975-1978 period. Since many of the claims in this
data pool would have been filed before the effective dates of the reforms (most of which appeared in
1975), the ramifications of the reforms on claims frequency could not be fully manifest. However, as
Danzon observes, a sharp reduction in the amount recoverable should have a somewhat sudden
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possible problem is the specification of the measured variable-legal change.
The mere fact that a legislature enacted a law relevant to a legal doctrine does
not necessarily imply a change in the law.' 22 It is hardly unknown for
legislatures to seek the appearance, but not the reality, of effective legislative
response to what some of the legislators' constituents perceive to be a serious
problem. 23 There is some evidence that this is precisely how most
legislatures responded to the malpractice crisis and that legislators got credit
for affirmatively responding to the medical profession's concerns without
delivering very much actual relief. One might question whether a truly
sophisticated constituency could have been taken in by reforms with little
substance, but in fairness to the medical profession, it would not have been a
simple matter to predict the effects of some reforms which, superficially at
least, seemed to promise much.
It would be enormously difficult to ascertain the precise extent to which
each of the enacted statutes altered preexisting law within each state.
However, some of the major enactments were more codifications than
modifications of the common law. For example, a perusal of the legislation
relating to general standards of care and proof requirements in malpractice
cases reveals little or no change in the common law of the enacting state. The
statutes dealing with standards of care typically incorporate the general
common law requirement of compliance with customary norms and some
version of the locality rule, usually without important changes. 124 With
respect to burden of proof, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appears wholly
unaffected by pertinent statutes in most states that addressed the doctrine at
all. 12 5 Of course, codification of existing law might serve the medical
profession's interests by curbing further judicial liberalization, but even this
goal would be accomplished only if the statute explicitly freezes the specific
effect on claims initiated. Given that claim severity was shown to be affected in this time period, it is
odd that no effect was seen on claim frequency. See P. DANZON, supra note 54, at 29-30.
122. See P. DANZON, supra note 54. Danzon's study is unclear as to "change." It appears that all of
the enactments identified in her Appendix A are treated as pertinent changes in the model.
123. See supra note 14.
124. Without providing an exhaustive reference list, the following comparisons of statutes and
cases will illustrate the point. First, the following illustrate the general care standards and the locality
rule. Compare ALA. CODE § 6-5-484(a) (1977) with Parrish v. Spink, 284 Ala. 263, 224 So. 2d 621
(1969), and May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982) (post statute case; standard permits reference
to national standard of physicians in same or similar circumstances); compare FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.43(a)(3) (West 1985) with Brooks v. Serrano, 209 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1968), and Mitchell v.
Angelo, 416 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1982) (post statute case; national standard); compare WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.7-.040 (1974) with Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967). In at
least one case, the "reform" statute was construed to liberalize the prior common law, even though
the court acknowledged that the statute's purpose in general was to garner protection for the medical
profession. See Ardian v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 360 So. 2d 1331 (Tenn. 1978).
Second, the following regard the informed consent issue. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.46a
(West 1985) with Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1965); compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118
(1980) with German v. Nichopoulous, 577 S.W. 2d 197 (Tenn. 1978); compare PA. CoNs. STAT'. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Purdon 1985) with Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 641 (1971).
See also Nelson v. Patrick, 58 N.C. App. 546, 293 S.E.2d 829 (1982) (explicit interpretation of statute
as codification of common law); Robinson v. MROZ, 433 A.2d 1051 (Del. 1981) (same).
125. See supra notes 102-05.
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point of law. '2 6 In most instances, the codification is in such general terms
that judicial discretion is not much curbed. Moreover, the reception given the
legislation to date suggests that the judiciary will not easily yield its law-
creating authority and traditional autonomy in this area. 27
One might expect legislation directly affecting the initiation of claims to
have greater effects, but changes in statutes of limitations and the discovery
rule usually left unaffected the largest category of latent-injury cases-those
involving foreign substances in the body after surgery. Statutes requiring
pretrial screening of claims cause delay, which may increase claimants'
litigation costs and thereby discourage marginal suits. However, although
there is evidence of delay,12 8 its costs may not be entirely borne by plaintiffs.
Thus, the availability of prejudgment interest in a growing number of states
partially offsets the cost to claimants, and, even where such interest is not
authorized explicitly, juries apparently make an implicit allowance for it in
setting general damages.' 29  Although the necessity for incurring the
additional costs of the screening process might discourage suits, much of this
cost would have to be incurred anyway in preparing for trial.
Danzon's study indicated that limits on contingent fees may have had some
effect on claim severity, though no effect on claim frequency was shown. It is
puzzling that a marginal reduction in the amount recoverable by attorneys
would not also yield a reduction in claim frequency. Perhaps the statutory fee
limits were equal to or higher than market-determined rates and thus did not
interfere with attorneys' incentives to take cases. In those states that gave
courts the discretion to set limits on fees,l3tt lawyers may have expected the
judges to be liberal. Moreover, most courts probably already possessed some
power over fees as part of their inherent supervisory authority over the bar. 1' 13
126. See TEX. REX'. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 7.01 (Vernon 1986) (forbidding future expansion
of the scope of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine).
127. Aside from cases that invalidate the statutes, see supra notes 84-85, a sampling of cases
interpreting statutes governing standards of care and burdens of proof indicates a disposition to view
them as not curbing the common law. See cases cited supra notes 96. 104. 124.
128. See supra note 107.
129. See Hammitt, Carroll & Relies, Torl Standards andjuty Decisions, 14J. LEG.AI. STUD. 751 (1985).
130. For a sample of statutes, see supra note 92. Of the seventeen states identified in Danzon's
study, only five enacted fixed limits. P. DANZON, supra note 54, at 41. Several states have more
recently enacted fixed limits on fees. See Florida Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of
1985 § 17, 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-175 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.575 (1986)); Il1. Pub. Act 84-
7, § 2-1114 (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 2-1144 (Smith-Hurd 1986)); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-14-7.5 (Supp. 1985). Utah's provision is noteworthy for its liberality. It places a ceiling of 33
1/3% of all damages, which is the percentage standard now commonly used.
131. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137, 139-40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 11
(1973); In re Chow, 656 P.2d 105, 110-11 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1982) (statute allowing court to limit
contingent fees codifies common law); American Trial Lawyers Ass'n. v. NewJersey Supreme Court,
66 N.J. 258, 262, 330 A.2d 350, 352 (1974); Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 105-07, 160 N.E.2d 43, 47,
188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 496-97 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960); Heller v. Frankston, 76 Pa.
Commw. 294, 303-04, 464 A.2d 581, 586 (1983) (statute limiting contingent fees unconstitutional as
an interference with inherent judicial authority to regulate fees), afd, 504 Pa. 528. 475 A.2d 1291
(1984). Contra Thatcher v. Industrial Comm., 115 Utah 568, 574-75, 207 P.2d 178, 181 (1949).
Despitejudicial authority existing independently of statutes, the legislation might still have had somc
effect as a signal to the courts to give special attention to the fee problem.
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Logically, the greatest effect on claims would be expected to come from
limitations on recoverable damages-through ceilings on awards, the
offsetting of collateral source payments, and the substitution of periodic
payments for lump-sum payments. Although Danzon's econometric study
detects some early effects on claims severity from the first two of these
reforms, there are some reasons why the long-term effect of these legislative
limitations might be limited. First, many of the most draconian limits were
struck down by the courts, and one might ask whether some legislators,
anxious to appear to assist the doctors, may have voted for the limitation
while anticipating precisely this result. Second, the states that modified the
collateral source rule frequently provided that only collateral payments from
public, not private, sources should be taken into account; also, most states
leave it the jury's discretion whether to deduct the collateral source
payments, 132 and it is possible that juries will ignore the invitation to offset
such payments or will adjust noneconomic damages upward to ensure that the
negligent provider is appropriately punished. Third, the states that have put
ceilings on noneconomic damages have been fairly generous in their
allowances; although a $250,000 ceiling (a typical amount) will undoubtedly
lower some potential multimillion-dollar awards, it will not affect the outcome
in many smaller cases.
As Danzon's studies show, absolute dollar limits on total recoveries or on
specific items of damages (noneconomic losses) did indeed reduce the
severity of claims and thus the total cost of the tort system for compensating
victims of medical malpractice. This result is not surprising because a very
small number of cases involving especially serious injuries account for a large
percentage of the system's dollar costs.13 3 Thus, putting effective ceilings on
'megabuck" recoveries should significantly lower actual payments and
improve the predictability of insurers' risks. The actual effect of partially
repealing injured patients' malpractice rights in this fashion would naturally
depend upon the ceilings set, but several states set limits (for example,
Indiana's $500,000 ceiling for total damages) that were calculated to have a
real impact. 134 Whether many other legislatures (or courts) will tolerate such
low ceilings on awards for actual medical expenses and lost wages (as opposed
to noneconomic losses) is questionable.
VI
CONCLUSION
Examination of individual reforms adopted by the states in the malpractice
crisis of the mid-1970's thus indicates that most of the flurry of legislative
activity was just that-more show than substance. Recent resumption of the
132. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
133. See P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, THE RESOLUTION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS, RESEARCH
RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS xiv (The Rand Corp., Report No. R-2793-ICJ, 1982) (study of
claims paid in 1974-1976 period; 5% of all paid claims accounted for 49% of total dollars paid).
134. See supra note 109.
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upward trends in both the frequency and the severity of malpractice claims
tends to confirm this judgment. 135 As the upward trend in claims is again
substantially increasing premium costs, 13 6 declarations of a new crisis have
been issued by the AMA, and other provider organizations. 3 7 Although the
new crisis is widely said to be more a problem of affordability than availability
of liability insurance, that distinction is of questionable usefulness. If
insurance is truly "unaffordable," it is, perforce, "unavailable" as a practical
matter. But whether insurance is in fact unaffordable remains to be
demonstrated. It is noteworthy that despite the continued increase in
premium costs, the ratio of such costs to average provider income has not
changed substantially. The AMA's own surveys show that average premium
costs as a percentage of physicians' gross income were about 3.7% in 1983,
down from 4.4% in 1976 and about the same as in 1979.138 Such averages do
not, however, reveal the significant deviations from the mean for particular
subcategories of providers. For example, obstetricians, not a high-rated
insurance class in the 1970's, have become one in the 1980's. 139 Also, very
rapid premium increases in such places as New York and Florida make the
affordability problem more serious, at least for the high-risk specialties. 140
135. A recent AMA survey reports that the average annual incidence in the number of claims per
100 physicians increased from 3.3 to 8 in the period from 1978 to 1983. See AMA TASK FORCE, supra
note 1, REPORT 1 (1984), at 15. Increase in the severity of claims also is reported. For example,
provider-owned companies tied to medical societies reportedly experienced an increase in average
paid losses of over 254% between 1979 and 1983. Id. at 17. There is no indication that the figures
were adjusted for inflation, however. Interestingly, the leading commercial underwriter, St. Paul Fire
and Marine, reports a rise in claim severity of less than half this amount over the longer period 1975
to 1983. Letter from St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. to author (Aug. 15, 1983).
136. For example, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., the nation's leading malpractice
underwriter, reports representative premiums that show increases in each of its rating classes from
1975 to 1983 of between 87% and 226% (unadjusted for inflation). Letter from St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. to author, supra note 135. Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Co., a New York
provider-owned carrier and the nation's second largest malpractice underwriter, reports premiums
that show increases of between 37% and 230% (unadjusted for inflation) over the same time period.
(Unlike St. Paul, Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Co. continued to write occurrence-based policies
exclusively until 1982, when it began to offer claims-made policies.) Letter from Medical Liability
Mutual Insurance Co. to author (August 31, 1983).
137. See sources cited supra note 1.
138. See AMA SURVEYS, supra note 22.
139. See N.Y Times, Feb. 12, 1985, at Al, col. I (large numbers of ob-gyn specialists were
reportedly giving up obstetrics as a consequence of increased premium costs). The change in the
frequency of claims against ob-gyn physicians is striking. AMA survey data show an average annual
incidence of claims in the 1976-1981 period of 15.5 per 100 physicians, more than three times the
frequency of claims prior to 1976. See Adams & Zuckerman, Variation in the Growth and Incidence of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 9 J. HEALTH POL., & POL'Y L. 475, 477 (1984).
140. The Florida controversy has involved highly publicized campaigns by the Florida Medical
Association to obtain, and the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers to oppose, a constitutional
amendment to limit malpractice awards. See Nat'l L.J., Oct. 22, 1984, at 3, col. 1. The Florida
Supreme Court removed the proposed limitation from the election ballot on procedural grounds.
Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1984). However, in 1985, legislation was enacted making a
number of more or less incidental reforms, such as mandatory periodic payments on awards over
$500,000, limits on contingent fees, and penalties for rejecting settlement offers within $25,000 of an
ultimate award. Florida Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985, 1985 FLA. LAws
ch. 85-175 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.575 (1986)).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The new "crisis" has prompted renewed efforts to obtain legislative
reforms. In 1985, nearly every state legislature considered some change in
substantive or procedural rules affecting malpractice claims. 141 To date, only
a few have enacted any reforms, 142 but it is premature to predict the long-
term results of continued lobbying by the medical profession.
The nature and importance of the reforms proposed and enacted in this
latest legislative round is highly variable. The single most common reform
proposed or enacted is abolition or modification of the collateral source rule.
Other changes include mandatory periodic payments, ceilings on contingency
fees, arbitration provisions, abolition of or limits on punitive damages, and
various procedural matters. The most striking feature of the reforms is that
most are targeted at marginal features of the tort system where changes seem
unlikely to have an important effect on either the frequency or severity of
claims. 143
The one proposed reform most likely to have a significant impact is
limiting recovery of noneconomic losses. To date, this reform has been
blocked-except in a handful of states that enacted it in the 1970's-but it
could yet gain significant support. Recent state and federal decisions
upholding California's $250,000 ceiling on noneconomic loss 14 4 no doubt will
be taken as important constitutional support for this reform. The reform also
may gain some additional visibility from federal legislation.
Congress has recently entered the picture with two legislative reform
proposals: the Federal Incentives for State Health Care Professional Liability
Reform Act of 1985 (the "Hatch bill") 145 and the Medical Offer and Recovery
Act of 1985 (the "Moore/Gephardt bill"). 146 The Hatch bill, introduced on
behalf of the American Medical Association, would enact a model for state
141. For a list of states and summary of reforms proposed and enacted, see Medical Liability
Monitor, Special Report, July/Aug. 1985.
142. See, e.g., CONN. PUB. ACT No. 85-574 (1985); Florida Comprehensive Medical Malpractice
Reform Act of 1985, 1985 Fla. Laws, ch. 85-175 (to be codified at FLA. $TAT. § 768.575 (1986));
Medical Malpractice Act, 1985 Il. Legis. Serv. 84-7 (codified in scattered sections of ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110, (Smith-Hurd 1986)); Act of April 15, 1985, 1985 N.Y. Laws, ch. 294, § 9 (codified at N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. LAw §§ 5031-5039 (McKinney Supp. 1986)); Act ofJuly 1, 1985, 1985 Utah Laws ch. 67,
§ I (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.5 (Supp. 1985)).
143. The Florida and Illinois statutes, supra note 142, are particularly striking illustrations of the
propensity to legislate around the subject. Though both statutes purport to be a comprehensive
reform, each is filled with minutiae on such matters as requirements for advanced notice of claims,
affidavits for nonbinding arbitration, and incidental provisions for risk management procedures in
health care facilities. The Florida statute does contain provisions dealing directly with the standards
of recovery. Florida Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985, 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-
175 § 10 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.45). However, the provisions make only the most
trivial changes in the prior statutory provision. The changes consist, for example, of such
modifications as substitution of "prevailing professional standard of care" for "accepted standard of
care" as the relevant norm that plaintiff must show was breached. Only a legal metaphysician would
believe that something important could turn on this type of verbal filigree.
144. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985); Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct.
214 (1985).
145. S. 1804, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 CONG. REC. S14,356-59 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1985).
146. H.R. 3084, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 CONG. REC. H.6353 (daily ed. July 25, 1985).
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legislation and would provide financial incentives in the form of grants to
states enacting reforms described in the model bill. The reforms are focused
on those subjects just mentioned as having been commonly targeted by state
legislatures: mandatory periodic payments for future damages over $100,000,
mandatory offset for collateral source payments, limitation on noneconomic
loss to $250,000, and sliding scale limitations on contingent fees. The bill
also contains certain other measures relevant to disciplinary action and
creation of risk management systems by hospitals.
The Moore/Gephardt bill also is designed primarily as a model for state
legislation. In the absence of state legislation, however, it would have
independent effect within the scope of health care provided to beneficiaries of
health programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and federal employee health
plans. The central thrust of the Moore/Gephardt bill is to eliminate
noneconomic damages and damages compensated by collateral sources
whenever the provider offers (within a specified time period) to make periodic
payments covering all economic losses (as they accrue) suffered because of
adverse results from medical treatment. Once the offer is made, the plaintiff
is foreclosed from pursuing conventional tort actions except where the
provider intentionally caused the injury or wrongful death has occurred.
In important respects the two reform bills are similar insofar as they focus
on elimination of the collateral source rule and the elimination or limitation
of noneconomic damages awards. The Moore/Gephardt bill, unlike the
Hatch bill, does extract a kind of quid pro quo for these curtailments of tort
liability to the extent that the promised payment of economic costs is not
conditioned on a determination of fault. Indeed, the basic idea originated,
independently of any concern with excessive or unwarranted medical
malpractice liability, with Jeffrey O'Connell as one of several permutations on
no-fault proposals that he has developed over the past twenty years.' 47
Despite this initial purpose, however, it is not certain that Moore/Gephardt
would achieve no-fault compensation.
There are two competing speculations. One is that because the offer to
pay economic losses is a purely voluntary choice of the provider (or the
provider's insurer), payments would only be made in those cases where the
plaintiff had a solid case for liability based on negligence and a significant
probability of recovering substantial noneconomic damages. In all other
cases the provider would resist the claim in court. On this speculation, it is
curious that the AMA has refused to endorse the Moore/Gephardt bill,
because it seems to be a no-lose proposition for health care providers: limited
liability for high-risk cases with a preserved tort option for low-risk cases. The
AMA's resistance to the Moore/Gephardt bill gives rise to the second
speculation about its effects: insurers would be too quick to settle claims that
the providers believed to be "nonmeritorious" but which could be settled for
147. See Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss,
44 LA. L. REV. 1267 (1984); see also O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused Foreclosure of Personal Injury
Claims by Defendant's Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 589 (1982).
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an amount less than the costs of litigation plus the expected value of an award
if plaintiff does recover (for example, such a claim might entail a low
probability of recovery but a high probability of substantial noneconomic loss
if there is a recovery). Of special concern here is the possibility that paying
full economic losses in such cases would lead to an increase in claims
frequency and, thus, increased premium costs.
This latter effect is an inherent risk of no-fault schemes generally, although
it is not obvious why it should be a substantial risk of an optional no-fault
scheme, where payments are in the control of the insurer. Perhaps the fear of
the AMA is that insurers will not be adequately sensitive to the general moral
hazard of no-fault payments even when the payment option remains in the
hands of the insurers. In addition, the AMA may fear that optional no-fault
would be the camel's nose in the tent, leading to a more general form of no-
fault compensation.
In any event, the AMA's legislative strategy seems somewhat confused. At
the very least, it is hard to match with its strong rhetoric about the flawed
character of the tort system. If the tort system is as deeply and systemically
flawed as AMA pronouncements have claimed, one can only wonder why they
have endorsed such marginal reforms as those proposed in the Hatch bill. By
the AMA's own analysis, those reforms would yield a quite modest reduction
in annual premium costs even if they were fully implemented. 148
Be that as it may, both the Hatch bill and the Moore/Gephardt bill do
perform a valuable service in calling attention to what some observers (this
author included) regard as a serious flaw in the present liability system: the
absence of effective restraint on awards for noneconomic loss. One can
accept the legitimacy of compensation for pain and suffering, in terms of
efficient deterrence as well as "fair" compensation, and even accept punitive
damages in limited cases, yet still be concerned about the lack of any limits on
the discretion of juries.149 In the absence of economic guidelines for
measuring noneconomic damages, some form of ceiling is probably the only
workable remedy.
148. An AMA-commissioned study of the expected premium cost savings that would result from
enactment of four major reforms proposed by the Hatch bill estimated savings for a "typical state"
adopting all four reforms to be 28%. The savings could, however, vary greatly from state to state
depending on the accuracy of the various assumptions applied to each state. One particularly
important assumption is that claims settlements would be reduced by the same amount as awards, an
assumption the basis for which does not appear in the report. See MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, INC., supra
note 13. Although a 28% reduction in premium costs cannot be dismissed as trivial, it certainly does
not match the reported premium increases in recent years. Moreover, 28% approximates the
maximum expected reduction (the range is estimated at 28%-33%). As the report indicates, a
change in certain assumptions could reduce the estimates substantially. For example, if claims
settlements were not influenced by the limitations on awards the savings would fall from 28% to 5%.
Id. at 3.
149. For an illustrative debate on pain and suffering as a compensable loss, compare Jaffe,
Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (1953) with W.
BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAw PROBLEM 35-36 (1964). On the role
of punitive damages, see Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1982);
Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
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Aside from damage ceilings, any array of other legal reforms might be
considered, including alternatives to the tort system such as enforceable
private agreements for risk allocation or alternative methods of dispute
resolution. 150 Conceivably, some form of true noncontractual no-fault
compensation mechanism might be considered for certain kinds of iatrogenic
injuries. Past proposals along these lines 151 have not attracted many
supporters, even among legal academics, let alone among politicians; yet the
possibility of a modest experiment, over a limited range of medical injuries,
deserves studied attention.
Of course, all such reforms pose the question whether there are principled
reasons for singling out health care accidents from the universe of accidents
in general. However, even if that question is answered in the negative, one
could argue that the controversary over medical malpractice is a useful and
appropriate occasion for taking a hard look at general features of the tort
system, as applied to all accidents. Unfortunately, it is probably unrealistic to
expect the medical profession, presently the most organized political force
actively pressing for tort reform, to concern itself with principles of accident
law in general rather than medical malpractice in particular. Such an
expanded vision of the problem would enable the medical profession to take a
more principled stance on reform, but it would also risk diffusing its political
influence over a wider arena of controversy and opening up the possibility of
changes not in its interest.
If, as the saying goes, past is prologue, it is difficult to foresee any major
tort reform arising out of the 1980's update of the malpractice crisis of the
1970's. A continuation of political wrestling between the medical profession
and the plaintiff's bar, accompanied by state legislatures' fitful intervention to
convey their "concern" to both constituencies by making some marginal
adjustments in liability-related rules, is more likely to occur.
150. See generally Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risk Between Patients and
Providers, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173.
15 1. See, e.g., Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"'-Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1233.
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